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What explains Syria's pro-Western foreign policy in recent years? The most 
common argument -- that the shift occurred because of the demise of the USSR, 
Syria's primary patron -- is, as this thesis demonstrates. inaccurate. Rather. this 
thesis proves that the changes in Syria's foreign policy began in the mid-1980s --
not in 1991 -- and were driven primarily by domestic economic factors, not by 
international structures. 
Syria's increasingly pro-Western foreign policy was a byproduct of economic 
liberalization policies (infiraj), begun in the early-l980s. For economic 
liberalization to succeed, Syria had to attract foreign -- primarily Western --
capital. In addition, the liberalization changed Syria's class structure, expanding 
and promoting to positions of influence a new class of Western-educated and/or-
looking entrepreneurs. Both of these developments pushed Syria in new foreign 
policy directions well before the collapse of the USSR. Its behavior in the Gulf 
War and at the Madrid Conference was more a reflection of altered Syrian internal 
politics than of the recognition that the United States was the only true superpower 
in a changed international system. 
This thesis has important policy and theoretical implications. It identifies the 
driving forces of Syria's current foreign policy behavior, and it pushes theorists 
to take seriously the domestic roots of foreign policy-making. 
v 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In the Summer of 1991, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad 
announced his intention to involve Syria in bilateral peace 
negotiations with Israel. To many analysts, this was not a 
surprise considering that Syria faced the post-Cold War world 
without a major sponsor to provide assistance and weapons. Asad's 
regime had for years been subsidized by Soviet assistance and Arab 
aid. With a reduction of Soviet military support -- arms and 
advisors -- and having faced a major reduction in Arab aid over the 
course of the 1980s, the 1990s indeed looked bleak to Damascus. A 
majority of authors mention these external factors as major 
motivators for Asad joining the peace process and, hence, 
"snuggling up" to the West. 
This thesis opposes the conventional argument that, in recent 
years, Damascus has sought closer ties to the United States because 
of international forces. Instead, I argue that Asad' s 
reconciliation with the United States and the West has been 
prompted predominantly by internal factors. Furthermore, I believe 
that Syria did not, in 1990 or 1991, decide to defect from its 
Soviet ally and attempt to court the United States. Rather, as far 
back as the early-1980s, Syria began to pursue initiatives designed 
to improve diplomatic and commercial ties to the West. 
As Arab aid was drastically curtailed in the early and middle 
part of the last decade, Syria entered a period of severe economic 
crisis. Economic structural problems, after having been masked for 
so long by the infusion of aid from the Gulf states, became evident 
by the mid-1980s. Asad realized that a floundering public sector 
only served to endanger the status and position of the regime in 
the long term. Therefore, in a bid to stimulate the economy, he 
approved policies of economic liberalization that allowed the 
private sector to expand and share the burden of recovery with the 
public sector. 
ix 
For economic liberalization to succeed, Asad recognized that 
it was necessary for Syria to attract Western capital. 
Additionally, liberalization empowered a "new class" of Western-
educated and/or -looking businessmen. As the regime integrated 
this new class into its coalition upon which it depended for 
support, businessmen became more successful at pressuring Asad to 
expand commercial contacts to the United States and the West. 
To improve the state of the economy and to improve the chances 
that the regime would survive for years to come, Syria pursued new 
foreign policy directions beginning in the early 1980s. The 
objective of foreign policy modifications, which began well before 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, was better relations with the 
United States. 
Syria's decision to negotiate with Israel in Madrid was one 
born of domestic considerations. Though the demise of the USSR 
served as the final catalyst for Syrian participation in talks, 




A. SYRIA'S MODIFIED STANCE TOWARDS PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 
In July of 1991, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad announced 
his decision to actively involve his country in peace talks 
with Israel to convene that October in Madrid. His acceptance 
carne in a letter to US President George Bush and followed 
months of shuttle diplomacy between Middle Eastern capitals by 
US Secretary of State James Baker. Syria took this step after 
a decade and a half of avoiding talks offered on similar 
terms. Asad had previously rejected peace conferences since 
the proposed format had placed the Arabs at a disadvantage 
vis-a-vis Israel. What drove Syria to the peace table in 
1991? Were external factors most important in Asad's 
calculations or did internal determinants weigh more heavily 
on the minds of those in the regime? 
Most scholars and policy-makers erroneously attribute 
Asad's willingness to negotiate in 1991, despite a proposed 
format that still favored Israel, to shift of power in the 
international environment. By the Summer of 1991, the Soviet 
Union, Syria's main provider of military assistance and arms, 
was on the verge of collapse. America stood as the world's 
sole superpower. The forging of a solid political coalition 
against Iraq and the subsequent decimation of Saddarn Hussein's 
military only reinforced the point that the United States 
would not let "pariah" states threaten American and Western 
interests. Those ascribing to the external perspective to 
explain Asad's modified stance towards talks, reluctant as he 
may have been, note that Syria feared international isolation 
and perhaps even feared becoming a future American target. 
Analysts believe that Asad opted to bandwagon with the United 
States and the West in the post-Cold War era in an effort to 
realize his ultimate foreign policy objective -- the return of 
Israeli occupied Arab lands, particularly the Golan Heights. 
1 
I argue, however, that Asad's decision to attend talks in 
Madrid represented one step in a long progression designed by 
Syria to improve ties with the United States. Syria could be 
seen reaching out to America years before the Gulf War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Positive diplomatic initiatives 
directed at the United States stemmed more from adverse 
factors within Syria, which arose early in the last decade and 
challenged the regime, than they did from external 
circumstances. A floundering economy, overwhelmingly 
dominated by state-led enterprises, was failing the country. 
Thus, Asad was prompted to speed up fiscal reforms beginning 
in the middle of the 1980s. 1 
Because the public sector was unable to provide for the 
dissatisfied Syrian populace by the early-1980s, a program 
stressing gradual economic liberalization was pursued by the 
regime. This was designed to share the responsibility of the 
overburdened and inefficient public sector with the growing 
private sector. As a necessary evil, the regime was forced to 
share a portion of its political power with new influential 
elements of society. 
While the regime maintained its control over society, the 
coalition upon which it depended for support in Syria grew to 
include business leaders and economists. A "new class" of 
entrepreneurs, seeking more lucrative markets, and civilian 
technocrats, looking to further liberalize the economy, were 
increasingly empowered. Entrepreneurs and technocrats pushed 
the regime for access to the West. 
This pressure, coupled with Asad' s recognition that Syria 
needed the United States to deliver peace in the Arab-Israeli 
1A campaign of gradual economic reforms had begun after 
the 1973 October War. Infiraj, meaning economic opening of 
the economy by mixing the public and private sectors, was 
curtailed at the end of the 1970s since it primarily 
benefitted opponents of the regime. 
2 
conflict, led Asad to pursue improved commercial and 
diplomatic relations with America, even as far back as the 
early-1980s. Asad realized that his regime needed the West in 
order to survive well before the collapse of the Berlin Wall 
or the decline of the Soviet Union. As a result, Syria, 
although largely behind the scenes, began to modify its 
foreign policy to one that was more conciliatory toward 
Western interests. 
When Asad accepted terms for a peace process that did not 
meet historical Syrian demands in 1991, it should have been no 
surprise. The traditional demands were originally drawn up 
after the 1973 War -- a time when Asad' s prominence had 
reached a pinnacle on the international scene. Those demands 
included: 2 
• No bilateral negotiations with Israel and no separate 
deals with Israel. The Arab states must form a single 
bloc that would negotiate opposite the Jewish state. 
• Negotiations or conferences must be held under the 
sponsorship of the United Nations (UN) with the 
participation of the USSR. 
• Israel must completely withdraw from territories 
occupied by Israel during the 1967 War, particularly 
the Golan Heights, as called for in UN Resolution 242 
and echoed in Resolution 338. Only then would Syria 
agree to talks with Israel. 
After a decade and a half of struggle in the internal and 
external arenas, the regime's optimism faded. The regime had 
likely faced the fact by 1991 that the above idealistic 
demands for a conference would not be met. 
Because US-Syrian cooperation was at a high point 
following the Gulf War and because Asad trusted, relatively 
2These demands were reviewed for me by Talcott Seelye, 
Ambassador to Syria from 1978 to 1981, during a personal 
interview, Washington, D. C., 21 June 1993. 
3 
speaking, the Bush administration, President Asad agreed to 
the US President's terms for negotiations. Asad approved of 
sending a separate Syrian delegation, along with delegations 
from other Arab states, to Madrid to engage in direct talks 
with an Israeli team of negotiators. He accepted American and 
Soviet sponsorship of the conference with the UN playing only 
an observer role. Lastly, Asad dropped his previous demand 
that the Golan be liberated from Israeli control before facing 
an Israeli negotiating team. 3 
M. Zuhair Diab writes, "The [Bush] initiative met some of 
the Syrian demands for a comprehensive settlement based on 
Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of 'land for 
peace.' "4 The opportunity represented Syria's best chance to 
further cement ties with the United States after exhibiting a 
near decade-long desire to improve relations with the West. 
Only after a six- or seven-year period characterized by 
gradually improving US-Syrian relations did Asad throw his hat 
into the peace ring. This was no hastily-constructed swing in 
policy. The decline of the Soviet Union, an external factor, 
served as a final catalyst for the Asad regime's altered 
approach to peace negotiations. However, the change in 
position toward negotiations stemmed predominantly from 
internal factors which negatively impacted upon Syrian 
prosperity and threatened the regime's status in the eyes of 
society. 
3Thomas L. Friedman, "Syria' s Move Toward Peace Talks: 
Is it Primarily to Improve US Ties?," The New York Times 17 
July 1991: A6. 
4M. Zuhair Diab, "Have Syria and Israel Opted for 
Peace?," Middle East Policy Volume III, Number 2, 1994: 83. 
4 
B. SYRIA'S INITIATIVES APPLIED TO THEORY 
There are various factors, such as external and internal 
ones, to consider when examining Asad's modified position 
toward peace talks. Likewise, there are conflicting 
theoretical approaches one may take when attempting to analyze 
Syria's moves. The first approach employs parts of an 
international relations theory and the second uses segments of 
a theory of political economy. 
I choose Steven Walt's popular international relations, 
balance-of-threat theory from his book The Origins of 
Alliances to evaluate Syria's case from the external 
perspective. Many analysts use terms Walt defines when they 
write of Syria's behavior over the past two decades. 
According to these experts, Syria "balanced" with the Soviet 
Union during the 1970s and 1980s against US-Israeli collusion. 
Balancing is presented by Walt as "allying with others against 
the prevailing threat. "5 These same experts believe that 
Syria's foreign policy changed in the 1990 - 1991 period. 
At the end of the Cold War, the analysts figure that 
Syria's sole alternative was to "bandwagon" with the United 
States. In Walt's words, bandwagoning is "aligning with the 
source of danger." 6 Analysts believe that Syria could not 
beat the US-Israeli partnership, so it "joined forces with the 
dominant power" 7 in a final bid to retrieve occupied Arab 
territories from Israel. 
Though the behavior of many nations may neatly fit into 
one of Walt's two categories of balancing or bandwagoning, I 
refute the assertion that Syria was adhering to one behavior 
or the other. Syria, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, was 
5Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1987) 17. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 172. 
5 
neither a balancer nor a bandwagoner. It was instead a 
"straddler" that walked the fence between the United States 
and the Soviet Union in an attempt to meet national 
objectives. 
Syria straddled East and West because the Asad regime 
figured that by playing both cards, it would best enhance its 
possibility for survival and increase the chance of seeing the 
return of the Golan Heights. Asad sent a delegation to Madrid 
as part of an ongoing diplomatic process designed to improve 
relations with the United States. This movement was quietly 
set in motion in the early 1980s at the prompting of 
businessmen and technocrats who levied pressure on the regime 
from within Syria. 
To clarify the political dynamics of this movement, which 
sprung from an acute economic crisis in Syria, I apply the 
theories of political economy as portrayed in Alan Richards' 
and John Waterbury's A Political Economy of the Middle East. 
Their work assists in explaining Syria's foreign policy 
modifications, especially as they relate to Syrian-US 
relations, which actually began in the mid-1980s. 
As Alan Richards and John Waterbury write: 
There are two great games being played out in the 
Middle East ... the more conventional great game in 
which regional and superpower politics 
intersect ... [the other] is a quiet game that seldom 
makes headlines ... It is the game of peoples and 
governments, states and societies, sometimes in 
cooperation but more often at odds, trying to 
advance the prosperity and development of the 
regions nations. 8 
Richards and Waterbury list Walt's works as a reference for 
the first great game. A Politic Economy of the Middle East 
8Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of 
the Middle East: State. Class, and Economic Development 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) 1. 
6 
though, is concerned with the quiet game. This is a game of 
"economic growth" and its associated structural change. As 
part of economic growth, according to the authors, "Some 
groups' wealth and power may increase faster than those of 
other groups." These groups form classes, and classes "mold 
state policy." Additionally, wr1 te the authors, "The process 
. of economic growth and structural transformation creates 
unintended outcomes to which state actors must respond." 9 
The authors' theories of political economy paint a 
representative picture of what happened to Syria during the 
last two decades. Economic growth occurred in Syria in the 
1970s and 1980s, bringing with it fiscal structural change. 
As part of this structural change, a new class of business 
leaders and civilian technocrats seized a share of the Asad's 
power base formerly occupied exclusively by the military-
state, bureaucratic complex. To ensure the regime's long-term 
survival, Asad and his top officials, as primary state actors, 
responded to the new class' and technocrat's requests to 
improve economic and diplomatic ties to the West. As a 
result, the regime modified Syria's foreign stance toward the 
United States beginning in the mid-1980s. 
9Ibid., 8 - 10. 
7 
8 
II. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
A. SYRIA, AN "ATYPICAL" STATE 
Most analysts attribute Syria's decis.ion to actively 
become involved in the peace process with Israel to forces 
which occurred outside Syria and beyond its immediate control. 
Around 1990, believe these individuals, the Soviet Union's 
decline and the emergence of the United States as the only 
true superpower (and facilitator able to deliver peace in the 
Middle East) forced Syria into compliance with terms for a 
peace conference that were once considered unacceptable. 
According to the external line of thought, Syria balanced with 
its Soviet sponsor against the United States and Israel until 
the end of the Cold War. Then, when the Asad regime could no 
longer play the Soviet card, Syria bandwagoned with America to 
obtain its support. 
Steven Walt's theories in The Origins of Alliances help 
explain the broad external forces and conditions that 
contribute to a country's alliance choices. However, Syria 
presents an atypical case that does not fit into Walt's 
categories for describing the behavior of a nation. Under 
Asad, Syria has proven to be a straddler and neither a 
balancer nor a bandwagoner. Upon examination, an external-
oriented argument fails when attempting to explain the 
motivations behind Syria's approach to the peace process. 
This chapter shows that Walt's theories do not serve as the 
best frame of reference for explaining why Asad modified 
Syria's approach to talks. 
B. LITERATURE ATTRIBUTING BEHAVIOR TO OUTSIDE FACTORS 
An abundance of literature links Syria's modified foreign 
policy in the post-Cold War world to a redistribution of power 
in the international arena. Alfred Atherton, a former 
9 
secretary of state for the Near East and South Asia (1974 -
1978) and ambassador to Egypt (1979 - 1983) states: 
With the end of the Cold War and the shift in 
Soviet Middle East policy, Syria no longer had a 
superpower mentor to help it achieve strategic 
parity. When Iraq emerged as a threat to the 
region's power balance with the eruption of the 
Gulf crisis in 1990, al-Asad saw an opportunity to 
end Syria's isolation; improve relations with the 
only remaining superpower, the United 
States ... Joining the military coalition against 
Iraq alongside the 11 Western imperialists 11 marked a 
historic reversal ... for Syria. Al-Asad put himself 
in a position to participate in postwar councils --
and to exert a claim to US sympathy for Syria's 
goal of recovering the Golan Heights in any renewed 
Arab-Israeli peace process. 10 
Talcott Seelye likewise writes: 
It was unquestionably Soviet disengagement from the 
region that forced Asad to abandon his 11 military 
parity 11 strategy and softened him up for the Bush-
Baker peace initiate of 1991. The weakening of 
Syria's client relationship with the USSR deprived 
Asad of his principle patron and forced him to look 
for alternative connections. With the indisputable 
emergence of the United States as the dominant 
outside power in the area, Asad concluded that he 
could best achieve his regional objectives by 
cooperating with Washington. 11 
Pulitzer-prize winner Thomas Friedman notes, 11 He [Asad] 
undoubtedly drew the lesson ... that there is only one 
superpower in the world and it is not the one that supported 
his Government for the last 20 years -- the Soviet Union. "12 
10Alfred Leroy Atherton, Jr., 11 The Shifting Sands of 
Middle East Peace," Foreign Policy Spring 1992: 129. 
11Talcott W. Seelye, 11 Syria and the Peace Process, " Middle 
East Policy Vol. II, No. 2, 1993: 106. 
12Friedman, A6. 
10 
Finally, Patrick Garrity notes, "The Syrians ... used the Gulf 
crisis as an opportunity to improve their ties with the United 
States, implementing a policy decision that had actually been 
made prior to the war in light of growing weakness of Syria's 
superpower patron, the USSR." 13 
These observations represent: the prevailing view and 
deserve some merit. However, they relate the Asad regime's 
security plight to events outside of Syria's borders which 
arose at the very end of the 1980s and during the beginning of 
the 1990s. An external argument provides neither an accurate 
nor complete explanation as to why the regime adopted a 
foreign policy stance previously rejected. Additionally, the 
widely accepted international relations theories found in 
Walt's writings, which rely upon external determinants, can 
not be accurately applied to explain Syria's behavior. 
Regarding Syrian behavior, Walt's writings are lacking in 
two areas. First, the Asad regime's diplomatic moves and 
contacts between East and West in the preceding two decades 
does not fit into Walt's neat categories of how a country 
should behave (balancing or bandwagoning) in the presence of 
a superpower competition. Second, Walt's theories fail to 
consider sources of domestic forces that were more threatening 
to the regime than were external forces in the 1980s. 
C. SYRIA AS A 11 STRADDLER 11 
Regarding President Asad's diplomacy from 1970 to 1991, 
Syria maintained extensive contacts with the Soviet Union and 
the United States. There existed a feeling of hostility 
between Washington and Damascus during the late-1970s and 
early-1980s that drove Syria closer to the Soviet Union. 
Despite the chilling of US-Syrian relations during the first 
13Patrick J. Garrity, "Implications of the Persian Gulf 




years of President Ronald Reagan's administration, history 
reveals numerous positive US-Syrian exchanges and a thawing of 
relations between America and Syria that began well before the 
start of the 1990s. The regime did not merely rework its 
approach to relations with the United States in 1990 and 1991. 
Throughout his rule, Asad has yearned for US diplomatic and 
financial backing while simultaneously milking the Soviets for 
weapons. To accomplish this, Syria simultaneously straddled 
the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Walt's predictions as to how a nation will respond to a 
threat -- in this case Syria responding to Israel -- do not 
include a category for straddling. Walt refers to only two 
categories of behavior, balancing and bandwagoning, to 
describe states' reactions to external threats. According to 
him, a threatened state will select one or the other of these 
options. Balancing is "allying with others against the 
prevailing threat," while bandwagoning is an "alignment with 
the source of danger." 14 Though it can generally be said 
that Syria and the Soviet Union balanced against Israel and 
the United States in the 1980s, neither option accurately 
explains Syria's behavior in the past two decades. Based on 
the history of Syria's foreign policy, there were times when 
Syria was both balancing and bandwagoning. Thus, as the next 
section shows, Syria was a straddler in its turbulent 
relations with the Soviet Union and with the United States. 
D. HISTORY OF SYRIAN RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS 
1. Asad's Perspective Developed 
The Syrian-Soviet relationship had been developing for 
fifteen years before Hafiz al-Asad ousted Salah Jadid in the 







working with the Soviet Union, were viewed with a certain 
amount of skepticism by the Kremlin. The new Syrian leader 
represented an uncertain variable, according to journalist and 
author Helena Cobban, "because of his perceived rightist 
preferences regarding domestic policy. "15 Additionally, As ad 
had criticized Jadid' s reliance on the Soviet Union. The 
Middle East Watch writes, "He was expected to distance his 
regime from the Soviets when he came to power in 1970. "16 
Soviet- style communism was a far cry from Ba' thism. 
Galia Golan writes, "There was little to bind the two sides 
ideologically except for the broadest interpretation of the 
Ba' th' s particular brand of Arab nationalist socialism. "17 
Despite any possible Soviet reservations, however, Asad 
"promised them [the leaders in the USSR] more predictability 
in the Arab- Israeli theater than had the more impetuous 
strategic predecessors. "18 Each party had an interest in the 
other for very practical reasons. 
The new president assumed the reigns following a 
humiliating defeat to Israel, including the loss of the Golan 
Heights, just three years before in the Six Day War. 
According to Sandra Mackey, "He emerged from isolation 
carrying a new set of convictions: that Israel was by its 
nature an expansionist power, and that only through immense 
effort on the part of the Arabs could this expansionism be 
15Helena Cobban, The Superpowers and the Syrian-Israeli 
Conflict: Beyond Crisis Management (New York: Praeger, 1991) 
113. 
16Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the 
Asad Regime, Middle East Watch (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1991) 138. 
17Galia Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East from 
World War Two to Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990) 143. 
18 Cobban, 114. 
13 
contained. " 19 Professor Raymond Hinnebusch, a respected 
expert on Syrian affairs writes: 
Asad and his faction ... rejected the legitimacy of 
Israel, but for them, the 1967 defeat forced the 
realization that Syria could do little to reverse 
the establishment of the Zionist state. This 
marked the end of Syria's messianic revolutionary 
activism and the beginning of realpolitik of 
limited goals. 
Asad, unlike his predecessors, would craft a scaled-down 
Syrian policy with the aim of recovering lands occupied by 
Israel after 1967. 
One of the few individuals outside of Asad's inner circle 
with repeated access to the Syrian President, biographer and 
British journalist Patrick Seale refers to Asad as a "creature 
of the 1967 War." Since that time, Seale believes that Asad's 
ultimate objective has remained consistent -- the retrieval of 
Arab lands lost by returning "Israel to behind its Six Day War 
frontiers and to contain it. "20 This goal has served as his 
regime's dominant foreign policy concern, guiding all his 
foreign policy moves up to and through the Madrid Conference. 
Early in his rule, Asad recognized that only with Soviet 
military and diplomatic support would this be possible. 21 He 
visited Moscow just two months after his ascension to power, 
and half a dozen other times between early-1971 and October 
19Sandra Mackey, Passion and Politics: The Turbulent 
World of the Arabs (New York: Dutton Publishers, 1992) 295. 
20Radio Program on Asad and Syria' s Role in the Peace 
Process, British Broadcasting Service, London, 20 January 
1994. 
21Raymond A. Hinnebusch, "Revisionist Dreams, Realist 
Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria," in Ed Bahgat Korany 
and Ali E. Dessouki (eds.) The Foreign Policies of Arab 
States: The Challenge of Change, Second Edition (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1991) 387. 
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1973, with the intention of further expanding the 
relationship. 22 
The Soviets recognized the practicality of keeping the 
Asad regime as a partner. A presence in the Middle East was 
important to the USSR due to spreading US influence in the 
region and because of the Middle East's proximity to the 
southern Soviet border. When Soviet officials and forces were 
expelled from Egypt by President Anwar Sadat in 1972, Syria 
replaced Egypt as both a tactical and strategic location from 
which to project Soviet power throughout the Middle East. The 
Soviets relocated their Mediterranean-based ships to Syria 
after their removal from Egyptian ports. 23 
Asad's diplomatic persistence paid dividends, as scores 
of advisors accompanied new and advanced weapon systems 
destined for Syria. A new air defense system complete with 
SAM(surface-to-air missile)-2s and SAM-3s was installed, the 
air force received MiG-21 and Su-7 fighter aircraft, and T-62 
tanks were delivered to the army. 24 As history shows, 
however, advisors and hardware did not ensure a Syrian-
Egyptian victory against Israel in the 1973 October War. 
2. Gains After the 1973 October War 
Despite a military defeat in that conflict and a post-war 
settlement which returned only a portion of Syrian land lost 
in 1967, Asad' s hopes of obtaining a long-term equitable 
settlement vis-a-vis Israel were actually heightened. Syria 
22Pedro Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship Since 1955: 
A Troubled Alliance (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) 87 - 91; 
and Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle 
East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) 188. 
23Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria and the 
Middle East Peace Process (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations Press, 1991) 150 - 151. 
24Ramet, 95 - 101. 
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emerged, in the eyes of its neighbors and to the superpowers, 
as a rather formidable military power and as state deserving 
attention. Unlike the Six Day War, Syrian forces had 
performed well in combat versus the Israelis. Drysdale and 
Hinnebusch remark: 
The October War demonstrated that the Arabs could 
fight, and it shattered their "fear 
barrier" ... Israel had, for the first time, been 
seriously challenged militarily. Its belief in 
security through military superiority was shaken. 
Furthermore, it was readily apparent that Israel would not 
have been nearly as successful without the massive US military 
resupply effort. 25 
As a result of the 1973 October War, Asad gained a 
recognition unparalleled by any previous Syrian leader; his 
stature improved both at home and abroad. In the words of 
Moshe Ma'oz, another of Asad's biographers: 
Asad' s prestige and popularity soared in Syria 
during the war and thereafter ... many of his 
followers now regarded Asad as the new pan-Arab 
leader, the worthy successor to Nasser ... Asad' s 
position in the Arab world was elevated during that 
period ... and several Arab countries ... gave her 
[Syria] financial and diplomatic support. In the 
international community Asad became a celebrity as 
major television stations and newspapers from 
various countries competed for interviews. 26 
President Asad figured that his new-found influence would 
translate into an improved regional position vis-a-vis Israel. 
His modus operandi for reacquiring Syrian lands lost in 1967 
25Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 107-108. 
26Moshe Ma'oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus. A Political 
Biography (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988) 96. 
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switched to diplomacy. A weakened military was unable to wage 
another campaign. Additionally, it seemed to the regime that 
the United States was willing to hear out Syrian grievances. 
Asad stated, "If political action will give us back our lands 
-- we will welcome it. "27 Consequently, his thoughts and 
rhetoric turned toward achieving a comprehensive and real 
peace to include all Arab states. Asad believed that if the 
Arabs presented a cohesive bloc, their chances to obtain a 
favorable solution would be enhanced. Therefore, Syria 
formally acknowledged UN Resolution 242 (338 was also accepted 
at the end of the war), which "explicitly accepted Israel's 
right to exist within secure borders. "28 
3. Flirting with the United States 
At the end of 1973, the Syrian leader had reason to be 
optimistic that a just settlement could be reached and Arab 
lands would be returned. Despite Sadat's wavering loyalties 
to the comprehensive Arab cause, Egypt still played a pivotal 
role in Asad' s envisioned power equation opposite Israel. 
Additionally, the United States, particularly Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger, seemed interested in serving as an 
impartial broker, willing to deliver a lasting peace for all 
parties involved. Lending credence to the proposition that 
Syria viewed the US initiatives as the only credible means to 
deliver peace is Kissinger's comment that Syria's Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abd al-Halim 
Khaddam, saw America's cooperation in negotiations as 
"essential." Kissinger notes that this was "revolutionary," 
since Khaddam, in general I loathed the us. "29 
27 Ibid. I 102. 
28Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 108. 
29Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1982) 849. 
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Asad and the regime appeared willing to place Syria's 
fortunes in the able hands of Kissinger and America. Seale 
notes: 
Only the United States had leverage over Israel, 
and Kissinger ... was the world-acclaimed magician of 
diplomacy. Flattered and intrigued by his 
presence, Asad was ready to put considerable trust 
in him ... Asad believed that the United States 
wanted Arab friendship and an honorable 
settlement. 30 
Asad was hesitant to negotiate in a step-by-step fashion 
preferred by Kissinger. However, during a reassuring visit to 
Damascus by President Richard Nixon, 11 'Nixon replied [to Asad] 
that the purpose of interim diplomacy ... was to nudge the 
Israelis backwards upon the Heights, step by step until they 
reach the edge, then tumble over.' It is no wonder, then, 
that As ad interpreted Nixon's words as a US commitment to 
Syria. 1131 Under the Nixon administration, Syrian- US 
relations were restored after having been broken off following 
the 1967 War. The United States gave Syria a financial grant 
as a result of Asad's conciliatory gestures and as an 
incentive to barter even more. For a time, trust between 
Washington and Damascus soared. 32 During this period, Asad 
enjoyed being courted by both the East and West while he 
straddled between the opposing camps. Here, Syria was neither 
truly balancing nor bandwagoning. 
Mutual trust and admiration between the United States and 
Syria, however, proved to be short-term following Nixon's 
30Seale, Asad, 231, 239. 
31Ma'oz, 100 - 101. 
32Wi ll i am B . Quandt , .::.P.:.:e:..:::a::..::c::..:e==--..:.P..:::r:...::o::..:c:::.;e=s-=s'-':'--__...A,..m..,e::..:r""'l=-· c=ac::.:n:......::D""'l=-· p=l""'o~m'""a=c:::..v . ..
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Washington D. C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1993) 220. 
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demise. Unfortunately for Asad and Syria, US motives for 
Syrian involvement in the peace process were very different 
than Syria's reasons for participation. The Syrian-US and 
Syrian-Egyptian relationships after 1974 would only worsen 
when two linking factors became increasingly evident. 
Kissinger's need to deliver a settlement and a strong US 
commitment to Israel prevented American diplomats from acting 
in the interests of Arab states. US diplomats, with no great 
concern for the rifts that such action would create in the 
Arab world, hoped to conclude separate peace treaties between 
Israel and the individual Arab states. Knowing that this 
would spell disaster for the Arab cause and for his country, 
Asad vehemently objected to bargaining in intervals. Even 
more discouraging was the knowledge that Sadat had every 
intention of 11 defecting 11 to the United States in an effort to 
receive benefits for his country, even at the expense of the 
comprehensive Arab cause. 
Egypt, through the efforts of US diplomacy, was gradually 
eliminated from the Arab coalition through two disengagement 
agreements -- Sinai I and Sinai II. Damascus was, by this 
time, disillusioned with the US role of mediator. Drysdale 
and Hinnebusch write, 11 Asad had come to believe that 
Washington's strategy was to keep Israel strong while dividing 
the Arabs, whose only hope for obtaining a comprehensive peace 
settlement was to maintain their solidarity and refuse to 
settle for less than UN Resolution 242. 1133 Then, due to US 
efforts at Camp David, Egypt abandoned its struggle against 
Israel in 1978-1979. 
Early in his administration, President Jimmy Carter tried 
acting in an impartial manner toward the Arab- Israeli conflict 
and showed interest in Syrian concerns. For instance, Asad 
was welcomed in the United States in 1977. Here, he meant to 
33Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 184. 
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promote his country's and the Arabs' position. Though Carter 
may have initially sought to serve the best interests of both 
Israel and the Arabs by seeking a comprehensive settlement, he 
ultimately bowed to domestic political pressures. Carter 
signaled his bias towards Israel when he commented, "I need to 
have American Jewish leaders trust me before I can make 
progress." 34 
Hafiz al-Asad, though still willing after Camp David to 
conclude a peace agreement with Israel, was reluctant to 
compromise for anything less than a settlement including all 
Arab states. Recognizing that the relationship between 
Damascus and Washington had soured, the Syrian leader yearned 
for better relations with the United States in the future. 
Asad, writes Drysdale and Hinnebusch, "could not afford to 
burn his bridges with the United States. He understood that 
Washington alone could restrain a more powerful Israel. "35 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance visited Asad a week after Camp 
David to sadly bid him farewell. 
Vance's remembrance of Asad's remarks were to provide a 
hint for what Syria's foreign policy was to become over the 
next decade: 
I remember Asad said something to me along the 
lines that he was ... now going to sit on the side of 
the road and observe events. If circumstances 
changed, he would not hesitate to change his 
position, although as in the past he would always 
be guided by the paramount interests of Syria. 36 
In the name of Syria's and the regime's best interest, Asad 
reconsidered the Syrian-US relationship. Here Asad calculated 
34William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986) 57. 
35Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 185. 
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that Syria's situation required Asad to shy away from harmful 
US diplomatic schemes. This must not be confused with Asad 
making a decision to balance against the US. 
4. Asad's Situation Worsens 
The paramount interests of Syria at the end of the 1970s 
necessitated a reevaluation of Syria's ties with other 
countries. Seale writes: 
The passage from the 1970s to the 1980s brought 
significant changes in the style and thinking of 
Syria's ruler. Optimism faded. A certain trust in 
the future gave way ... as the world showed itself a 
complex and cruel place. 37 
As Asad accepted a new agenda, he attempted to form new 
alliances. The Front of Steadfastness and Resistance in 1977 
and, later, the Arab Eastern Front were without cohesion and, 
thus, largely ineffective. 38 Hinnebusch notes, "By 1980 
Syria had seldom been so isolated ... and more likely to be left 
on its own devices in case of Israeli attack. "39 The 
situation for Syria would only get worse before it would 
improve. 
a. Israeli Aggression and Strengthened Ties with 
the United States 
While his Arab "friends" failed him, his adversary 
and its major backer, Israel and the United States, presented 
Asad with valid reason for concern. The victory of Israel's 
Likud party and the appointment of Menachem Begin as Prime 
Minister in 1977 ushered in a more dangerous era for Syria in 
37 Ibid., 337. 
38 Ibid., 310- 311, 314. 
39Hinnebusch, "Revisionist Dreams," 387. 
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the Levant. Begin's expansionist attitude toward Israel's 
place in the region resulted in the building of additional 
Jewish settlements in the Israeli-controlled and -occupied 
lands won in 1967. Included was the annexation of the Syrian 
Golan Heights in 1981, including the erection of Jewish 
settlements there. Then came the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 
a vital strategic area for Syria, in 1982. Syrian forces were 
routed early in June. Israeli forces destroyed 400 Syrian 
tanks and 80 aircraft during the attacks. 
A British journalist in Lebanon at the time noted: 
The sheer speed and depth of the mass Israeli 
invasion stunned ... the Syrians ... As we passed their 
tanks, the soldiers by the roadside looked at us 
and I noted that their eyes seemed unusually large. 
They gazed at us in an uncomprehending way and they 
repeatedly looked around them, at the hills above, 
at the sky, towards the sea. They were 
frightened. 40 
With what Asad interpreted as the onslaught of Israeli 
aggression, Syria's neighborhood was becoming an increasingly 
dangerous place. 
A major factor that led to Asad' s growing insecurity 
was the expansion of the US-Israeli relationship in the early 
1980s. This bond became both tighter and more formal for 
several reasons. First was Jewish political influence over 
American politicians. As one of the most powerful and 
effective lobbies in the United States, the American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) donated large sums of money 
to pro-Israeli individuals seeking elected positions in the US 
government. There was, of course, no corresponding pro-Arab 
40Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon 
(New York: Macmillian Publishing, 1990) 215. 
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lobby to counter this sentiment in the United States or, 
likewise, to promote Syrian interests in the USSR. 41 
More significant in boosting Begin while alienating 
Asad was the overarching ideology of the Reagan administration 
which included integrating Israel into US Cold War policies. 
Reagan, during a 1979 campaign speech, recognized that ''only 
by full appreciation of the critical role the state of Israel 
plays in our strategic calculus can we build the foundation 
for thwarting Moscow's designs in our national well being. "42 
Along with the US President, most of his foreign policy 
officials and advisors held the conviction that, as in other 
geographic regions, the Cold War was to be played out in the 
Middle East. Israel would serve as our main accomplice there. 
As America's major ally in the region, Israel signed 
a 1981 Memorandum of Understanding with America, elevating 
Israel to the position of strategic partner. As a result, 
Israel became privy to increased aid and weapons assistance. 
Despite the fact that Israel violated US-set terms under which 
US-supplied weapons could be employed in Lebanon, US gave 
Israel over $27 billion during the Reagan years. This amount 
was a third more of all US aid granted to Israel in the 
previous thirty-two years (1948 - 1980). 43 
b. Syrian Relations with the United States Sour 
As the US-Israeli courtship matured in the early-
1980s, the previously-established atmosphere of cooperation 
between the United States and Syria dissipated, at least in 
41Ahmed S. Khalidi and Hussein Agha, "The Syrian Doctrine 
of Strategic Parity," in Judith Kipper and Harold H. Saunders 
(eds.) The Middle East in Global Perspective (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1991) 200. 
42George W. Ball and Douglas B. Ball, The Passionate 
Attachment: America's Involvement with Israel. 1947 to the 
Present (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1992) 108. 
43 Ibid., 109. 
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outward appearance. In the eyes of the Reagan administration, 
Syria was a location where the Soviet bear had been allowed to 
set foot. The administration's overwhelming perspective was 
that Syria was a "Soviet surrogate whose interests could be 
disregarded and whose punishment represented a victory over 
Moscow. "44 To US policy-makers, Syria presented a clear 
threat. Initially and foolishly under the Reagan 
administration, US diplomatic initiatives set out to isolate 
the Asad regime, as American military operations aimed to 
thwart Damascus' influence in the region. 
In the early-1980s, the United States and Syria 
clashed over policies and events in the Levant. For instance, 
when the Reagan administration drafted the Reagan Peace Plan 
of 1982, it ignored Syrian interests and failed to consult 
Damascus. The plan called for a confederation between Jordan 
and the Israeli occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Though 
the plan eventually proved ineffective due to opposition by 
Begin and the Likud, at least American drafters had considered 
Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian concerns. 45 
Then, in 1983, the United States, Israel, and 
Lebanese Christians drafted the May 17 agreement. This 
document made an Israeli troop withdrawal contingent upon the 
removal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. In what proved to be 
a mistake, the US and Israel did not seek Asad's approval. 
Drysdale and Hinnebusch note: 
Washington expected to force the accord on 
Syria ... "Lets leave the Syrians on the outside 
looking in," Reagan told Israeli Foreign Minister 
Yitzak Shamir." Secretary of State George Schultz 
failed to include Damascus on his itineraries until 
the agreement was signed ... not wishing to give the 
Syrians a chance to raise objections ... In Syrian 
44Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 188. 
45Quandt, Peace Process, 345. 
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eyes, the May 17 agreement rewarded Israel for its 
invasion and was taken by Asad as an insult. 46 
To add insult to injury, Damascus was criticized for its 
noncompliance with the treaty by Deputy Secretary of State 
Kenneth Dam, who spoke of Syria's 11 willingness to sabotage 
progress in Lebanon. 1147 Quandt notes that 11 the United States 
and Syria seemed to be on a collision course, 1148 after the 
May 17 agreement. For a few different reasons, US-Syrian 
relations would get worse before improving. 
Syria demonstrated its animosity toward Washington's 
policies by allowing aggressive acts to occur in Lebanon. In 
the Spring of 1983, the US embassy was attacked by a suicide 
car bomber. Then on 23 October 1983, 241 US Marines perished 
at the hands of an Islamic extremist driving a van loaded with 
explosives. Since Syria had ties to Shiite extremist groups 
in Lebanon and since guerrillas were trained on Syrian-
controlled, Lebanese territory, Syria was partially to blame 
for the events. Reagan ordered US troops home from Lebanon in 
early 1984. 
These two attacks received special attention from 
Reagan, not only because of the carnage they caused -- almost 
three hundred dead and over one hundred wounded -- but also 
because of Reagan's staunch anti-terrorism stance. By the 
mid-1980s, the United States and the West would, on many 
occasions, charge Syria with either direct or indirect links 
to terrorism. 
46Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 191. 
47Barbara M. Gregory, 11 U. S. Relations with Lebanon: A 
Troubled Course," American-Arab Affairs, Winter 1990- 1991: 
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Additionally, Damascus served as the headquarters 
for rejectionist Palestinian organizations which had a hand in 
several operations aimed at Western assets and individuals. 
One of the groups with offices in the Syrian capital, Abu 
Nidal, was responsible for attacking ticket counters in the 
Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985. 49 
On 17 April 1986, Nezar Hindawi, a Jordanian with 
reported links to Syrian intelligence, attempted to plant a 
bomb on an Israeli El Al jetliner at London's Heathrow 
airport. Hindawi was convicted in a British court for 
attempting to destroy the aircraft, and Syria was held 
partially responsible. 50 Along with the United Kingdom and 
West Germany, the United States withdrew its ambassador from 
Damascus shortly after the conclusion of the Hindawi trial. 
Vice President George Bush remarked, "We are convinced that 
their [Syria's] fingerprints have been on international 
terrorist acts." A US State Department spokesman said, "The 
Syrian government is already well aware of our concern over 
its support for terrorism. "51 In another blow to relations 
between Damascus and Washington over the terrorism issue, 
Damascus was held responsible for the December 1988 downing of 
Pan Am 103 over Scotland. 
For several reasons, some justified and some not, 
Syria and the United States had fallen into disfavor with one 
another. A common misperception, though, is that diplomacy 
between the two nations was altogether hostile and that 
49Seale, Asad, 467. 
50Jill Smolowe, "Questions about a Damascus Connection," 
Time, 20 October 1986: 53. 
51
" Syria: Terrorism Accusations Levelled by US," MEED 10 
May 1986: 27. Syria has been included since 1979 on the 
State Department list of nations supporting, sponsoring, or 
harboring terrorist organizations. 
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Damascus and Washington failed to cooperate on any issue until 
1990. 
Syria's attempts to gain US favor and, conversely, 
American moves to work with Syria in recognition of Damascus' 
undeniable position in the region, began well before 1990. 
Despite uneasy feelings between Syria and the United States 
throughout the 1980s, there existed a state of tacit 
acknowledgement and hesitant respect for the another beginning 
around 1983. As in the 1970s, Syria remained a straddler in 
the 1980s and not a balancer against the United States. While 
refusing to burn his bridges with the United States, in the 
name of Syria's interests, Asad felt it necessary to 
strengthen his ties with the USSR to guard against Israel. 
5. Soviet-Syrian Cooperation vs. US-Israeli Collusion 
As mentioned, with the conclusion of negotiations between 
Israel and Egypt in 1979, the United States cemented its role 
as the prominent superpower in the Middle East. Asad realized 
that until the United States acknowledged Syrian concerns, 
diplomatic channels could not be pursued as the only means to 
achieve an equitable settlement opposite Israel. The Syrian 
leader also recognized the role of his Soviet provider as the 
party willing to assist Syria in countering Israel. A Middle 
East Watch publication notes: 
In his hour of need ... the Soviets once more 
provided strong support to Asad. Since the Camp 
David accords ... (Syria and the Soviet Union had 
been among the biggest losers as a result) Asad had 
become their most important regional ally. 52 
Mutual misgivings were bridged between Damascus and Moscow in 
the name of individual security concerns. 
52Syria Unmasked, 139. 
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In a speech delivered in Damascus on 8 March, 1980, Asad 
stated: 
Israel is backed by the United States with large 
quantities of sophisticated weapons ... We know that 
we need the assistance of this big friend [the 
Soviet Union] in our current battle. "53 
In June 1980, an article appeared in Tishreen, the official 
government newspaper, stating that Syria "is seriously 
preparing to take an advanced and qualitative step towards 
closer cooperation with the Soviet Union. "54 In dire 
straights, it appeared that Asad would comply with Soviet 
policy-makers requests despite their reservations. 
As part of a marriage of convenience, the regime signed 
a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union 
on 8 October 1980, which Seale states "was far from being a 
strategic alliance." 55 The 
Syria's nonaligned status, 
treaty promised 
while calling for 
to respect 
increased 
economic, political, military, scientific, technological, 
cultural, and social cooperation. In exchange, Moscow had 
been allowed to expand its port privileges at Latakia and 
Minat al-Baida. 56 The provisions of the agreement were vague 
in nature, as was probably the desire of both parties. Asad 
hoped for the best case scenario where arms, assistance, and 
even troops, if the situation warranted such a move, would be 
provided without exceptional Soviet meddling in either 
53
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external or internal affairs. Meanwhile, the Soviets desired 
an increased physical military presence and an expanded 
political influence in the Mediterranean. 
After signing the treaty, Asad worked hard to convince 
Moscow that Syrian differences with Israel fit into the 
overall superpower struggle for the Middle East. Seale notes: 
To grab the Kremlin's attention, Asad argued that 
the United States was planning to use Israel and 
Lebanon as a springboard for further aggression, a 
thesis which seemed borne out by Reagan's decision 
in August 1982 to send US Marines to Beirut. He 
[Asad] knew it would be to his advantage if the 
Soviet authorities saw the Middle East as a 
decisive prize in East-West competition. 57 
Until the United States was willing to take Syrian interests 
into account, Asad needed enhanced Soviet military and 
political support. 
Allegations by Asad of US-Israeli collusion, backed by 
fear of that alliance, fell on sympathetic ears in the 
Kremlin. The Soviets supported a call by Asad to expand 
Syrian forces both quantitatively and qualitatively. Since 
diplomacy would not work as a means to solve the Syrian-
Israeli conflict on terms favorable to Asad, then perhaps 
military might or the threat of force would work in achieving 
goals. Asad stated in 1981: 
If the military balance is needed to liberate the 
land and repel the aggression, it is needed equally 
to implement the just peace ... Peace could never be 
established between the strong and the weak. 
57Seale, Asad, 398. 
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------------------------------------------------... 
Syria had first mentioned the term "strategic parity" or 
"strategic balance" in 1974. 58 At that time, it supposedly 
implied equality with Israel on military, social, and economic 
fronts. During the 1980s, however, the term came to be 
associated almost exclusively with the acquisition of military 
might. Asad believed that only by meeting Israel head-to-head 
could the country first deter the Jewish threat and eventually 
negotiate an honorable peace. 
In November 1982, Asad visited Moscow for two reasons. 
First was to pay his last respects to the deceased Soviet 
Premier, Leonid Brezhnev. The other purpose of the trip was 
the acquisition of additional arms after a poor showing by 
Syrian troops using Soviet-made weapons against American arms 
in Lebanon earlier in the year. 59 Andropov told Asad, "Take 
from the Red Army stocks. I will not allow any power in the 
world to threaten Syria. " 6° Consequently, the arms 
floodgates were opened over the course of the next few years. 
Advisors and weapons including modern battle tanks, 
combat aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), surface-to-
surface missiles, and artillery pieces poured into Syria. As 
part of the deliveries, the Syrians acquired the capable high 
altitude SAM-5 and the formidable MiG-29 air-to-air fighter 
aircraft. 61 As the inventory of arms grew, so too did the 
number of troops to employ these weapons. By 1986, the number 
of Syrians in uniform stood at approximately 400,000 -- up 
58Ma'oz, 177. 
59Talcott W. Seelye, "The Syrian Perspective on the Peace 
Process, " Arab-American Affairs Summer 1986: 58. Seelye 
writes, "Soviet humiliation at the appalling military 
equipment losses suffered at the hands of the Israelis during 
the Lebanese fighting in 1982 has resulted in a more 
substantial Soviet arms commitment to Syria." 
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from 225,000 just years before. Approximately five percent of 
the Syrian population in the mid-1980s served in the armed 
forces. 62 
With advanced weapons, some of which would realistically 
allow Syria a deep strike capability for the first time, the 
stakes stood much higher for Israelis, should they decide to 
attack Syria. While Syria's military potential grew in the 
mid-1980s, Asad's autonomy to launch an attack employing these 
weapons without Moscow's approval was reduced. According to 
Seale: 
The Soviet Union wanted greater influence over its 
protege, an instinct natural in a patron, so to 
secure the weapons and protection he needed Asad 
had to surrender a certain freedom of action. 
While he retained control over tactical and 
operational matters, he lost some control over 
ultimate strategy. His aspiration for parity with 
Israel had become a Soviet benefaction, to give or 
withhold ... Asad was more constrained than before, 
but he was also a good deal safer. 63 
While Syria's position in the 1980s meant a great deal to 
Moscow, steps were taken to ensure that Syria did not drag 
Israel and its US backer into a full-scale confrontation. That 
would have been disastrous for the USSR, since the Soviet bear 
was already bogged down in Afghanistan. 
6. Cracks in the Soviet - Syrian Relationship 
Moscow recognized that Asad' s nationalist and anti-
Israeli position was important in hedging US power in the 
region. Even though Syria was a valuable ally to the Soviets, 
Asad's policies, more than a few times, conflicted with Soviet 
interests. For example, he had irritated his providers in the 
1970s by attacking the PLO in Lebanon in 1976 and by 
62Seale, Asad, 3 98. 
63 Ibid., 399. 
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supporting Iran in the first Persian Gulf war against Iraq, 
another recipient of Soviet aid in the Middle East. The 
Syrian President had also ignored the USSR while counting on 
the US to deliver peace in the 1970s. 
Although Asad was somewhat more subordinated to Soviet 
control after signing the treaty, he still proved himself to 
be a thorn in the Soviet's side. For example, in 1980, Asad 
deployed Syrian forces along Syria's common border with Jordan 
to pressure King Hussein. He did this without consulting the 
Soviets. In 1981, Asad moved surface-to-air missiles into 
Lebanon's Bekka Valley. Again, this was done without the USSR 
receiving a courtesy call from Damascus. Syrian forces then 
engaged in fighting in Lebanon without previous 
coordination. 64 Asad's actions in the early-1980s, even as 
the Soviet Union provided his military with scores of weapons, 
proved that he was anything but a Soviet a puppet. 
Under Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Asad was to 
find that his military and foreign policies would not be as 
graciously received and financed. Golan writes that no longer 
would the Soviets turn a blind eye as differences were to 
emerge "over Asad' s ambitions in Lebanon, the demands of 
Damascus for strategic parity with Israel, and Syrian's 
fundamental hostility to Israel as well as to many of the 
countries, from Egypt to the Gulf, with which Moscow was now 
pursuing improved relations. " 65 Soviet domestic economic 
constraints, ideological modifications, and fear of becoming 
involved in a Middle East conflict opposite the United States 
led to a drastic decline in weapons transfers during the 
Gorbachev era. The estimated value of arms transferred to 
Syria from the USSR during the 1980 - 1984 time period was 
64 Ibid., 397. 
65Golan, 278. 
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$2.9 billion, in comparison to somewhere between $1 and $1.3 
billion from 1985 to 1989. 66 
By the end of the decade, 
numerically equaled those of Israel. 
Syria's armed forces 
In some categories of 
weapons the Arab state's arsenal exceeded Israel. 67 However, 
stark indicators that Moscow preferred a change in its 
policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict became 
embarrassingly evident to Asad. 
During an April 1987 Soviet state-sponsored dinner at the 
Kremlin in front guests, Gorbachev delivered a less than 
welcome message to Asad and the Syrian delegation, which had 
just that day praised the USSR as its "cornerstone in Syria's 
independent policy .... against Israeli aggression. "68 
Gorbachev began his address with a reaffirmation that the 
Soviet Union would "assist Syria further in maintaining her 
defense capacity at the proper level." He mentioned that 
considering: 
revolutionary changes are underway in the Land of 
the Soviets [and that] realistic analysis of the 
present-day world which has markedly changed 
recently, ... The stake on military power in settling 
the [Arab-Israeli] conflict has become completely 
discredited. 
Furthermore, Gorbachev stated that, "The absence 
of ... relations [between Israel and the Soviet Union] cannot be 
considered normal. "69 Gorbachev' s 24 April deli very would 
66Cobban, 119; Golan, 279. 
67Khalidi and Agha, 193. Relying on a number of sources, 
including The Military Balance published by the International 
Strategic Studies in London, authors Ahmad Khalidi and Hussein 
Agha provide a ratio chart for Syrian forces opposite Israel 
in 1982 and in 1989. 
68Foreign Broadcast 
edition, 28 April 1987: 
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serve as the Syrian regime's first official, but not the only, 
wake-up call. 
In February 1989, after a visit to Damascus, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze commented that "more 
arms" did not equate to "greater security" for Syria. 70 
Alexander Zotov, Soviet ambassador to Syria, announced that 
Syria's military assistance requests for the next five years 
would need to be "scrutinized critically" at a 18 September 
1989 news conference. 71 Two months later, Zotov announced 
that Syria should adopt "reasonable sufficiency" in its 
struggle against Israel. This was a clear indication that the 
Soviet Union, though it would still supply weapons to Asad's 
forces, no longer intended to support Syria's drive for 
"strategic parity. 1172 
By the late-1980s, Syria's defense posture had been 
greatly strengthened from that of 1982 when Asad's forces had 
been routed in Lebanon by Israel. However Asad's attempt to 
play the Soviet card to obtain a military edge over Israel 
fell short. Israel was no closer to returning occupied Arab 
lands than it was in 1973 or 1982. Fortunately for Syria, 
when Soviet support was reduced at the end of the 1980s, Asad 
had not chosen, to slam the door on the United States. 
7. Exchanges with the United States During the 1980s 
During the 1980s Asad masterfully pumped the Soviet Union 
for arms while keeping diplomatic channels open to the West. 
This was despite Reagan's less than conciliatory policies 
toward Syria. Both Syria and America recognized the utility 
of ties to one another. For the reason of mutual recognition 
70Golan, 280. 
71Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 166. 
72Cobban, 120. 
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of the others' important role in regional affairs, a 
relationship characterized by cooperation on a few key issues 
was maintained, uneasy as though that cooperation may have 
been at times. In the 1980s, Syria straddled both East and 
West. 
After a few years of mutual hostility, there is evidence 
that as early as 1983, relations between Damascus and 
Washington were actually improving. Despite the failure of 
the May 17 agreement, Secretary Schultz traveled to Damascus 
on 6 July 1983 to consult with Asad and keep negotiations over 
Lebanon ongoing. The Syrian President, as Seale mentions, was 
willing to cooperate: 
Asad in turn did not want a severance of contact 
and kept the door open to Washington, agreeing to 
the formation of a US-Syrian working commission to 
consult on Lebanon. A couple of weeks later, in an 
evident gesture of goodwill, he engineered the 
freeing of David Dodge, the acting president of the 
American University of Beirut who had been abducted 
by a pro- Iranian group a year earlier. Syrian 
agents actually rescued Dodge from Tehran, an index 
of Asad's interest in a relationship with the 
United States. 73 
Despite ideological differences, Damascus and Washington were 
able to find common ground on matters of importance. 
Just months after labeling Syria a hindrance to peace, 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, a proponent of 
improved relations with Damascus, 74 testified with quite a 
different message before a congressional committee in July 
1984. He labeled Syria a "helpful player" in Lebanon. 
Barbara Gregory writes, "The ... new and more conciliatory 
approach toward Damascus was essentially a concession to 
73Seale, Asad, 412. 
74
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Syria's ... political and military influence in Lebanon." 75 
Reagan, and later President George Bush, were dissatisfied 
with Syria's presence in Lebanon. However, both presidents 
were generally willing to cede to Syrian interests there in 
the name of keeping diplomatic channels open between 
Washington and Damascus. 
Syria built on its relationship with the United States by 
taking initiatives which it hoped would appease America. For 
instance, in 1987 after the Hindawi trial, Asad closed the 
offices of Abu Nidal in Damascus. The organization apparently 
had a hand in the operation at Heathrow, though likely outside 
of Asad's direct control. Syrian members were threatened with 
imprisonment if they opted to engage in further actions, and 
non-Syrian members were asked to leave the country. 76 
Additionally, Mohammed al-Khouli, implicated in the Hindawi 
affair, was removed from his post as chief of air force 
intelligence and coordinator between all intelligence 
agencies. His sacking was in response to pressure by the 
British over Hindawi affair in London. 77 
These events lead to increased diplomatic exchanges 
between Syria and the United States. On 2 September 1987, US 
Ambassador William Eagleton returned to his duties in Damascus 
after an absence. 78 Nine months later, as a demonstration of 
good faith, Edward Djerejian was posted to Damascus as 
Eagleton's replacement. The move was viewed "as a fresh sign 
of the improvement in relations with Washington, " since 
Djerejian had been working closely with Richard Murphy. The 
75Gregory, 6 9 . 
76
"Syria," MEED 13 June 1987: 43. 
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Middle East Economic Digest (MEED) notes that the United 
States and Syria stepped up consultations by mid-1988 over the 
issues of Lebanon and peace in the region. 79 
In 1989, in another move to please the West, Asad agreed 
to meet with representatives from Amnesty international in 
Syria to discuss human rights. This lead to the release of 
3,000 incarcerated prisoners two years later. 80 
Even more significantly in May 1989, Syria dropped its 
objections to Egypt's readmission into the Arab League at the 
Casablanca Arab Summit. According to Diab, at Casablanca, 
Asad "revived his favored, regional axis of Saudi Arabia -
Egypt- Syria," with the result of "restoring good American-
Syrian relations. " 81 In December, full diplomatic ties were 
reestablished and flights were resumed between Damascus and 
Cairo. 
American delegations headed by significant figures 
traveled to Syria in the Spring of 1990 to begin formally 
cementing a relationship. Former President Jimmy Carter and 
Senator Bob Dole both received the message from Asad that 
Syria was prepared to work toward a just and comprehensive 
peace in the Middle East. As a sign of Syrian good will after 
the meetings, an American hostage held in Lebanon, Robert 
Polhill, was released in April. 82 
Later in 1990, in an attempt to build a coalition of 
states against Iraq, including Arab nations, President Bush 
enlisted President Asad's help. In exchange for participation 
in Desert Shield and then Desert Storm, the United States 
79MEED 27 May 1988, 28. 
80Mahmud A. Faksh, "Asad' s Westward Turn: Implications 
for Syria," Middle East Policy Volume II, Number 3, 1993: 57. 
81Diab, 82 - 83. 
82 Itamar Rabinovich, "Syria in 1990," Current History 
January 1991: 31. 
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agreed to turn its head when Syrian troops stormed Beirut to 
consolidate their hold over Lebanon in October 1990. As a 
reward for Syria having sent troops to the Gulf, Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, two Gulf countries with extensive ties to the 
United States, contributed almost $2 billion to Syria. 
Asad's bid to cultivate better relations with the United 
States and its allies, which began well before the demise of 
the Soviet Union, were not taken out of a spirit of good will 
towards the United States. Nor do these moves represent a 
desire to abandon its relationship with the Soviet Union. In 
1990 and 1991, as throughout his entire rule, Asad was walking 
the fence. Again, Syria was neither truly balancing or 
bandwagoning. At the turn of the decade, Asad was successful 
at straddling because it was to the United States' interest to 
have Syria as an accomplice against Iraq in the Gulf War. 
The Gulf War simply served as a catalyst for As ad to 
align some of his interests with those of the United States. 
Simultaneously, it was not in Syria's best interest to 
alienate itself from the Soviet Union. Syria continued to 
receive weapons from the Eastern Bloc even though the amount 
of arms had been largely curtailed since the late 1980s. 
Mustafa Tlas, the Syrian Defense Minister, traveled to 
Moscow in February, 1991, to seek additional arms for 
Damascus' stockpile. According to Professor Fred Lawson, "The 
Syrian delegation argued that accelerated shipments of 
military assistance were necessary to offset the advanced 
armaments and other war materiel dispatched to Israel by the 
United States in the Fall and Winter of 1990 1991. " 83 
Before later reneging on his promises, President Gorbachev 
vowed to further assist Syria with its defenses. Asad's ploy 
to receive additional arms from the Soviet Union is not in 
83Fred Lawson, "Domestic 
Steadfastness in Contemporary 
Winter 1994: 57 - 58. 
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Transformation and Foreign 
Syria, " Middle East Journal 
line with Syria's supposed bandwagoning effort with the United 
States. 
Asad, the ultimate politician, has amazingly been able to 
protect the regime and Syrian interests, despite changes to 
Syria's external environment. He has done this by neither 
steadfastly siding with or against either superpower. He has 
masterfully courted both the Soviet Union and the United 
States. Walt's theories on balancing and bandwagoning, 
therefore, do not accurately apply to Syrian behavior. Syria 
was a straddler during the 1970s, 1980s, and into the 1990s. 
E. INTERNAL VULNERABILITY AS ASAD' S MAJOR CONCERN 
My second criticism of applying international relations-
based theories such as Walt's when predicting with whom a 
state will ally is that this approach subordinates domestic 
developments to external events and circumstances. No state 
reacts solely according to what happens outside its borders. 
Walt acknowledges this himself. 
In The Origins of Alliances, Walt discusses Anwar Sadat's 
motivations for seeking closer ties to the United States after 
the October War. As one of the Egyptian President's decisive 
factors, Walt mentions that "a host of economic troubles posed 
a growing threat to Sadat' s regime. " 84 As was the case with 
Sadat' s government, the Asad regime's credibility was severely 
challenged beginning in the early-1980s due to an economic 
crisis. The regime's major threat originated not as much from 
Israel as it did from elements within Syrian society. 
Unlike Walt, many political scientists consider an 
examination of a state's internal environment equally or more 
important when identifying a regime's key threats. Randall 
Schweller, in a critique of Walt's theories, credits Steven 
David with "arguing that ... [the] state-centric perspective 
84Walt, 177 - 178. 
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ignores the 'often fatal nature of the international and 
domestic political environment that characterizes the Third 
World. Author Deborah Welch Larson, also cited in Schweller, 
"offers an institutional approach that measures state strength 
by the nature of its state-society relations. " 85 It is these 
state-society relations, a topic covered in the next chapter, 
which I believe drove Asad to seek closer ties to the United 
States and modify his position towards the peace process. 
Examining outside factors in isolation from the picture 
inside Syria does little to explain Asad's decision to 
approach the peace table in 1991. Though external 
circumstances served as the final catalyst, only an 
understanding of Syria's internal economic and political 
environments in the 1970s and 1980s leads to an understanding 
of Asad's foreign policy modifications. 
85Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning 
Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," 




III. INTERNAL FACTORS 
A. PEACE TALKS TO ATTRACT WESTERN CAPITAL 
Only by examining Syria's internal situation during the 
1970s and 1980s is it possible to understand why Asad sent a 
delegation to Madrid in 1991. Daniel Pipes writes: 
Domestic factors usually determine the main 
directions in interstate relations. Other reasons 
can account for specific actions, but the central 
lines of a state's foreign policy invariably derive 
from the nature of its domestic life. 1186 
An economic crisis, originating from domestic shortcomings, 
surfaced in the early part of the last decade and endangered 
the credibility of the Syrian Ba'thist regime. Though Asad 
had marginally liberalized the economy in the 1970s, by the 
early-1980s, the economy was still built principally on a 
failing public enterprise system. Fearing political upheaval 
in the long term, Asad began a second, more encompassing 
economic liberalization campaign in the mid-1980s designed to 
satisfy the Syrian populace and key political supporters. 
Civilian economists, led by US-trained economist Muhammed 
Imadi, opened the economy for tradesmen to work their magic, 
and a new class of businessmen arose in Syria. Technocrats, 
who orchestrated the economy and received financial kickbacks 
from their friends in the business world, and the members of 
this new business class, who were charged with expanded the 
economy, caught Asad's ear in the process. Consequently the 
coalition upon which the regime depended for support grew, and 
these newly empowered individuals gathered influence. 
86Daniel Pipes, Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition 
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Technocrats and the new class pressured the regime for access 
to financial markets outside Syria. 
Primarily for internal reasons, and in the name of its 
own survival, the regime was forced to pursue improved 
diplomatic and commercial ties to the United States. Though 
Asad's modified foreign policy may not have become evident 
until the imminent demise of Syria's Soviet sponsor around 
1990, subtle domestic maneuvers were afoot as early as the 
mid-1980s. These moves, indirect as though they may seem, 
were designed to make Syria more attractive to the United 
States and to improve relations with the West. 
To substantiate my claim that internal events drove Syria 
to Madrid, major economic developments in the past two decades 
are highlighted. Next, inadequacies are presented that led 
the regime, in the mid-1980s, to modify foreign policy to one 
more in-line with US interests. Attending peace talks was a 
late edition to policies authored in the mid-1980s designed to 
pull Western capital into Syria. 
B. ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1970s 
The 1970s was a time of impressive economic advances in 
Syria and of improved prosperity for most of the country's 
citizens, especially with regard to developing countries' 
standards. Average growth in gross domestic product for 1970 
1979 was a remarkable ten percent. 87 One major factor 
which fueled this improvement in the economy and increased 
revenues across the entire Middle East was the oil boom of the 
1970s and early-1980s. Like other countries there, 
increased domestic crude output to bolster earnings. 
Syria 
Oil 
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became Syria's largest export by 1974, unseating cotton as the 
major cash-producer. 88 
Due to labor shortages in the Gulf, Syrian workers in 
search of opportunity eagerly flocked there to work in the 
expanding oil industry. Remittances from approximately 
400,000 persons, almost 15 percent of all Syrians who worked, 
sent home a sum equivalent to $774 million in 1980. 89 
Large-scale foreign aid from Gulf nations' oil earnings 
was also introduced into the Syrian economy. Saudi Arabia, 
enjoying overwhelming prosperity, lent Asad money for Syria's 
struggle as a front -line Arab state against Israel. 90 Peak 
lending to the public sector occurred from 1979 - 1981 at an 
amount of over $4.8 billion. 91 This windfall went, of 
course, to buy weapons and to develop a new and somewhat 
modified Syrian economy that had been adversely affected by 
the 1973 War with Israel. 92 Israeli operations had destroyed 
$4.5 billion in capital goods. To revitalize infrastructure 
after the 1973 October War, the Syrian economy was slightly 
88Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Syria Country Profile 
for 1986 - 1987, 12. 
89Victor Lavy and Eliezer Sheffer, Foreign Aid and 
Economic Development in the Middle East: Egypt. Syria. and 
Jordan (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991) 17, 31. The 
figure of $774 million for 1980 compares to a paltry $7 
million drawn from Syrian worker remittances in 1970. 
90EIU Syria Country Profile for 1991 - 1992, 52.Later in 
the decade, Syria was promised an annual $1.8 billion from the 
Gulf States at the Baghdad Summit of 1978. Amounts received 
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reorganized. 93 To help in the rebuilding effort, the 
government channelled increased funds from financial sponsors 
in the Gulf into industry, transportation, and 
communications. 94 
Additionally, as part of the general scheme to pump money 
into the reconstruction effort, the Asad regime decided to 
recruit the help of Syria's business community. A policy of 
infiraj, akin to infi tah policies in Egypt, instituted a 
program of limited liberalization to recruit assistance from 
the private sector. This two-stage process was welcomed by 
businessmen after a period of nationalization pursued by 
preceding Syrian heads of state during the 1960s. President 
Asad cautiously encouraged privatization during the 1970s 
primarily in the service and commercial sectors. 95 
Yahya Sadowski notes, 11 Private entrepreneurs were 
encouraged to help rebuild the economy by establishing small 
firms, often acting as subcontractors or agents ... of the 
government. 11 The plan was largely successful. Coupled with 
Gulf oil, the Syrian economy was greatly expanded within three 
years. 96 
93Yahya M. Sadowski, 11 Ba'thist Ethics and the Spirit of 
State Capitalism: Patronage and the Party in Contemporary 
Syria, 11 in Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, Ideology 
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While Syria's financial situation improved in the 1970s, 
the authors of the new policies also changed priorities within 
the economy itself. Emphasis shifted from developing the 
agricultural sector to modernizing and expanding the 
industrial sector. For instance, although agriculture barely 
edged out industry in allocations under the 1970 - 1975 Five-
Year Plan, twice as much capital was invested in the 
latter. 97 
During the 1970s, as was the path followed in the Middle 
East by other countries such as Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia, and 
Algeria, Syria pursued a policy of import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) designed to diversify its economy and 
earn cash from the export of goods. 98 Initially, as is the 
case in most countries pursuing a strategy of ISI, most 
industrial energy in Syria went toward producing consumer 
goods which were rapidly bought up. Products became 
increasingly available in Syria, and consumption of simple and 
intermediate goods grew 14% between 1973 and 1981. 99 During 
the 1970s and into the first few years of the 1980s, the 
standard of living was improved for most persons. Standard of 
living in Syria, though, did not improve equally across class 
lines. 
C. BENEFICIARIES OF INFIRAJ AND GRAFT 
Certain groups found themselves much better off relative 
to other element in society as a result of infiraj. Under the 
reform to improve Syria's economy, and hence regional 
standing. They also pushed reform, according to Sadowski, 
because they could line their pockets with kickbacks. 
97Askari and Cummings, 227. 
98Richards and Waterbury, 26. 
99Lavy and Sheffer, 21. 
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presidency of Hafiz al-Asad, the lifestyle of the middle- to 
upper-class, playing upon both official and unofficial links 
to the government, advanced at a much more rapid pace than did 
that of the average Syrian during the same time period. 100 
Concerning this phenomenon, Volker Perthes writes: 
From a societal standpoint, Syria's post-1970 
development strategy was inegalitarian. The 
policies of infitah, the large financial capacities 
of the state after the 1973 October War, and the 
demands of a growing middle class provided great 
opportunities ... A new enriched stratum emerged. 101 
The first sector of the Syrian populace that benefitted 
the most from the opening of the economy was made up of 
individuals whose goal was the supply of goods to meet the 
consumer demands of society's upper crust. Perthes calls 
these people the new industrialists. Most of the people in 
this group have secondary educations and come from merchant or 
craft families. Unlike the original Syrian industrialists, 
who focused on heavy industry, the new industrialists 
concentrated their energies into producing items for 
consumption by the middle and upper classes of society. 
According to Perthes, the new industrialists had profit and 
not politics in mind: 
The new industrialists' production is mainly 
import-substitution, serving the consumer demands 
of society's upper half .... The state is not his 
product, but he is the product of this current 
state. 102 
100Volker Perthes, "A Look at Syria's Upper Class: The 
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Two other groups had an interest in politics under the 
Asad regime, since the politics of economics benefitted them 
directly. The first was the state bourgeoisie and consisted 
of persons in prominent government positions such as Ba'th 
party officials, ministers, governors, high-ranking military 
and security officers, and directors in the public sector. 
Perthes believes: 
This group, owing its position to its loyalty to 
the regime and often its personal connections to 
President al-Asad, has acquired not only 
significant political and economlc power but 
personal wealth as well ... mostly by illegal, though 
not always covert, methods ... This group became rich 
from theft, bribes and commissions. 103 
Heading this list are such names as Rif'at al-Asad, brother of 
the President and one of three current vice presidents; 'Abd 
al-Ra'uf al-Kasm, a former prime minister; and Mustafa Tlas, 
Minister of Defense. 104 Also included in this group, were 
civilian technocrats who constructed the policies of infiraj. 
Involved in a mutually profitable relationship with the 
state bourgeoisie, the new commercial class made money under 
infiraj and, conversely, lined the bourgeoisie's pockets with 
kickbacks. Made up of a relatively small group of people, 
oftentimes the sons of the members of the state bourgeoisie, 
this group is also known as the new class. 105 They are most 
often middlemen who share profits with government and 
103 Ibid. I 33 - 34. 
104 Ibid., 33- 35. 
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bureaucratic officials in formal and informal (black market) 
sectors of the economy. Perthes write that members are: 
traders, contractors, official agents for foreign 
companies, and investors in services and 
international finance [using] illegal or 
manipulative methods to run a business that in 
itself is generally legitimate ... They tend to form 
monopolies in some sectors of the national 
economy. 106 
The new class, which invested great sums of money in the 
food, computer, and oil industries both inside and outside of 
Syria, were even less commit ted to Ba' thist- socialist ideology 
than their fathers' in the regime. 107 The bourgeoisie and 
the new class continued to make money hand over fist into the 
1980s, while the Syrian economy as a whole deteriorated. 
D. THE ECONOMY COMES APART AT THE SEAMS -- THE 1980S 
Despite impressive developmental strides made in the 
1970s, Syria's economic lot worsened significantly in the 
1980s. Since government officials were not always forthcoming 
with statistics and because the black market generated unknown 
amounts of goods and currency into the economy, it is 
difficult to ascertain the precise status of the Syrian 
economy at any one time. However, some key indicators and 
statistics reveal unfavorable trends which cropped up during 
the 1980s. 
Before 1976, Syria had been barely able to cover payments 
owed to other countries and international agencies with 
foreign aid. A balance of payments deficit ensued after the 
mid-1970s, draining foreign currency reserves. In early 1977, 
106Perthes, "The Bourgeoisie and the Ba'th," 35- 36. 
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the amount of foreign currency held equaled about $220 
million. A US government publication on Syria mentions: 
Only grant aid, largely from Arab oil-producing 
states ... averted an economic crisis. Although 
grant aid cushioned the economy, foreign exchange 
reserves continued to dwindle. 108 
In 1982, $185 million was stored in Syrian coffers. By 1984, 
the total stood at only $100 million after having dipped even 
lower the preceding year. 109 
External debt also plagued the regime during the late-
1970s and into the 1980s. Total debt owed amounted to $411 
million in 1973 and increased by $800 million by late 1977. 
At the end of 1984, the figure had more than doubled from 
seven years before, standing at $2.5 billion. 110 By the end 
of 1987, external debt was estimated at $4.678 billion, not 
including that owed to the Soviet Union for military support. 
Damascus' debt to Moscow approached $15 billion in the late 
1980s. 111 Arrears of over $100 million owed to the World 
Bank caused the organization to cut off dispensing of new 
funds to Syria in late 1986. 112 
That same year, the European Economic Community released 
a report charging that the economy was in 11 bad shape 11 due to 
the regime's practice of ignoring the structural problems 
inherent in the economy in favor of pursuing politically-
oriented goals. The report concludes that 11 The budget, like 
108Syria: A Country Study (Washington, D. C.: United 
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the economy as a whole is distorted by the discrepancy between 
the official exchange rate and the free market rate." 113 
Depreciation of the Syrian currency was labeled as "the 
most important indicator of the government's economic problems 
in 1986" by David Butter, a MEED analyst. A fluctuating 
exchange rate adversely affected the working class in Syria by 
causing acute price increases for imported foods and basic 
goods. 114 
While prices rose, figures for Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) declined in the middle and latter parts of the decade. 
This was due to industrial shortcomings exacerbated by 
agricultural problems, as well. Rizkallah Hilan writes, "The 
rate of growth of the national manufacturing sector remained 
moderately positive during the 1970s, attained its maximum 
between 1980 and 1983, then slumped and became negative from 
1986." 115 By late 1989, industrial output measured less than 
fifty percent of its estimated potential due to import 
shortages of raw materials and spare parts. 116 Kais Firro 
notes that this was extremely disappointing since there 
existed in the regime, "a belief in the value of industry as 
an instrument of societal development and of 'economic 
independence.' "117 Industry and its inherent deficiencies, 
failed to deliver the country into modernity and toward 
113
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"strategic parity" with Israel. Inflation in the early 1980s, 
writes Perthes, "fluctuated at unprecedented levels around 30 
percent, causing severe hardship for the majority of the 
population. "118 The rate of inflation more than tripled by 
1989. 119 Despite the dismal performance of the economy in 
the 1980s, a ray of hope emerged at the end of the decade. 
E. ECONOMIC UPSURGE IN THE LATE-1980S 
Optimism was born anew in the latter part of the decade. 
A MEED article from July, 1988, notes: 
The first half of 1988 has seen a remarkable 
turnaround in the economy's performance, resulting 
from a combination of sound management, a bumper 
agricultural season, and rising oil 
production ... For the first time in years, the 
government has been able to consider a substantial 
rise in budget expenditure, including an allocation 
for external debt servicing. 120 
Due in part to the USSR's demand for agricultural produce and 
Eastern European desire for cheaply-produced, European-style 
clothing fashions made in Syria, the Soviets began to accept 
goods in place of hard currency. This assisted the Syrians in 
paying the enormous debt owed to the USSR. Then, Damascus 
registered its first trade surplus in thirty years in 
1989. 121 
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The regime hoped that the discovery of new oil fields in 
1984 in the eastern part of Syria would pay large dividends 
and deliver Syria out of its peril. 122 By 1988, increased 
oil production reduced the current account deficit to $475 
million -- one half of what it had been just a few years 
before. Optimism faded, though, as technicians discovered 
that oil was located only in small, isolated pockets. 123 
Additionally, reports out of Syria in 1989 indicated that a 
large oil field probably had been permanently damaged by 
overproduction. 124 Though the financial situation was 
gradually improving, Syria was still a long way from having a 
diversified, vibrant economy able to provide prosperity for 
the majority of Syrians. 
One periodical described the conditions for the average 
man as disheartening at the onset of the 1990s: "Syria is 
slipping into economic decrepitude ... Any visitor to Damascus 
can testify to the visibly worsening economic situation. "125 
Various factors, some of which accentuated already-existing 
structural problems, contributed to Syria's economic troubles 
in the 1980s and early-1990s. 
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F. ROOTS OF THE CRISIS 
The Syrian economy was adversely influenced by a 
combination of factors. Structural inadequacies were masked 
during the 1970s because of large amounts of aid and 
subsidized oil received from the Gulf states and Iran. When 
that assistance was curbed in the early 1980s, domestic 
economic shortcomings became painfully conspicuous. When the 
regime realized that, in the long run, it would need access to 
Western markets to ensure its long-term survival, it began to 
modify its foreign policy. Changes were initially subtle or 
indirect, but they were designed to make Syria look more 
attractive to Western governments and investors. 
1. Peripheral Factors 
The poor performance of the economy in the 1980s can be 
partially attributed to some peripheral influences: the 
decline of oil prices in the early 1980s, a rift in relations 
between Syria and its Arab allies due to Asad's support of 
Iran against Iraq, and inflated military spending -- including 
an expensive intervention in Lebanon. 
As global prices for oil declined by the mid-1980s, 
Syrian petroleum revenues also decreased. Additionally, 
annual domestic consumption of oil had rapidly climbed since 
the middle of the preceding decade -- up 45% between 1975 and 
1980. The figure grew larger still throughout the 1980s. 126 
Also impacting the economy in the 1980s, Gulf nations' 
generosity, in the form of economic assistance to Syria, 
ebbed. This was due to fiscal cutbacks within the Gulf 
countries themselves and dissatisfaction by leaders there of 
the direction of Asad's foreign policy. 
126Firro, 4 9. 
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Another factor that had negative consequences for Syria's 
economy stems from Asad's aggressive regional policies that 
were often in opposition to the wishes of his generous Arab 
donors. Beginning in 1983, according to Perthes, 11 growing 
political differences between Syria and her wealthier Arab 
brethren led to a decline in aid. 11127 While official 
transfers, which were made up almost exclusively of 
contributions from Arab neighbors, peaked at $1.819 billion in 
1981, by 1985 this figure was reduced to $1.061 billion. 128 
These differences stemmed, in large part, from Asad's 
conflictual policies towards the Palestinians and from his 
support of Iran against Iraq in the 1980 - 1988 Gulf War. 
Iran supplied Syria with assistance beginning in 1982 
after Syria closed the trans-Syria Iraqi oil pipeline. The 
agreement traded Syrian support against Iraq for one million 
tons of free Iranian oil; five million more tons was supplied 
to Syria at a discount. Iran provided Syria with the 
equivalent of almost a billion dollars annually between 1982 
and 1986. In 1986, disagreements arose between Iran and 
Syria, and Iran decreased the amount of assistance bound for 
its Arab partner . 129 Iranian aid never equaled the amount of 
Arab aid Syria lost by opposing Iraq. 
To secure and promote Syria's strategic interests in the 
dangerous Levant, President Asad increased military 
expenditures drastically in the mid-1970s. Representing a 
large portion of the overall national budget throughout the 
next decade, defense allocations remained high until domestic 
deterrents and failures necessitated that the regime reduce 
them. Hilan notes: 
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National security expenditures make up about 30% of 
the total of public expenditures (running costs and 
development costs) in Syria [still in the early 
1990s] . They amount to approximately 50% of the 
running costs, which have risen considerably since 
1975. 130 
In dollar costs this equated to an annual increase from 
approximately $900 million in 1976 to $1.9 billion by 
1983. 131 
Beginning with the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, Asad 
expended tremendous great amounts of resources and deployed 
thousands of troops to keep Lebanon quiet and free from 
Israeli influence. The budget outlay to cover the expenses of 
forces deployed in Lebanon as part of the Arab Deterrent 
Forces, composed almost exclusively of Syrian troops, soared 
from $450 million in 1976 to approximately $1 billion a year 
by the early 1980s. 132 The events in Lebanon may not have 
actually caused as large a shock to the Syrian economy as the 
above numbers suggest since the majority of Syria's costs in 
the Deterrent Force were financed by the Gulf states. 133 
Events outside of Syria only exacerbated economic 
structural problems that surfaced in the early and mid-1980s. 
When Arab and later Iranian aid was appreciably trimmed back, 
these internal, structural problems became evident. Flawed 
fiscal planning and inadequate social policies were the true 
culprits behind the economy's demise in the 1980s. Domestic 
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crisis was caused 
the government's 
development strategy." 134 Various authors and analysts 
disagree as to the degree which the regime exhibited 
incompetence or at least a lack of concern towards forging a 
coherent development strategy. 
a. Poor Planning 
In a harsh criticism of the regime's fiscal 
policies, Godfrey Jansen writes, "The country has no fiscal or 
monetary policies: economic plans and the national budget are 
almost wholly notional. "135 Not quite as scathing in his 
comments, Hinnebusch writes, "The Ba'th has given fairly 
consistent direction ... but has fallen down badly in 
translating this into coherent enforced plans or in providing 
adequate resources to implement them. "136 There are dozens 
of instances where the government demonstrated poor planning 
skills. 
Major industrial projects were often pursued in 
haphazard fashion. For example, in the late-1970s and early 
1980s, a new paper plant was to be built for $110 million in 
Dayr al-Zur with Austrian and Italian support. According to 
Seale: 
It failed to operate on Syrian wheat straw and in 
any event not enough straw could be delivered to 
the plant; its large boiler was not designed for 
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Syrian heavy oil; its turbine broke down, causing a 
five-month stoppage; the foreign personnel walked 
out; the contractors were taken to the 
International Court; the raw material was switched 
to wood and cotton lint involving further expensive 
adjustments to the machinery. In the end it would 
have been cheaper to continue importing paper than 
to build the mill. 137 
Numerous similar cases occurred because Syria lacked a 
coherent economic program, due both to incompetence at the 
local or project level and apathy toward fiscal planning at 
the national level. 
President Asad, as the dominant voice in domestic 
and foreign issues, must take primary responsibility for 
Syria's fiscal doldrums. Reportedly, he gave little personal 
attention and priority to steering the economy towards 
prosperity. Until the mid-1980s when the crisis became acute, 
the economy consistently took a back seat to issues of 
national and domestic security. During the first decade and 
a half of Asad's reign, top economic and finance posts were 
generally filled by incapable individuals and officials with 
a limited say amongst political insiders . 138 
b. Misallocation Between Agriculture and Industry 
Economic architects fell short in the 1970s and 
1980s in achieving a harmonious balance between the 
agricultural and industrial sectors. Starting from the 
initial years of Asad' s rule, state budgets reflected the 
importance industry held over agriculture Syria's 
traditional source of income. Hinnebusch mentions that 
declining public funds destined for agricultural projects 
137Seale, Asad, 448. 
138 Ibid., 452. 
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indicate that "agriculture does not:. seem to enjoy a first rank 
priority in elite councils. "139 
During the 1970s and 1980s, funds diverted away from 
agriculture and into industry failed to produce the revenues 
desired. Over the long term, more money probably could have 
been available for industry if economic directors would have 
maintained a larger role for agriculture and then used profits 
from crops for production of goods. Due to lack of foresight, 
economic development was not fully realized. Hinnebusch 
notes, "The critical weakness in the Ba'th effort ... is the 






industry at the 
or agro-
expense of 
agriculture, however, is not an uncommon phenomenon in the 
Middle East and developing world. 
On this subject, Richards and Waterbury write: 
Many have thought of industry as the leading sector 
of development, a sort of engine that pulls the 
rest of the train behind it. There is much truth 
to this picture, but the neglect of the 
agricultural sector can be disastrous. The 
agricultural sector provides not only labor, but 
also food, raw materials for processing, exports, 
and needed foreign exchange, a domestic market for 
local industry, and an investable surplus, which 
may be used to construct industrial facilities.~ 1 
Other factors beyond the misallocation of funds plagued the 
agricultural sector, as well. 
A severe drought during the 1980s impacted upon 
industry due to the shortage of certain raw materials derived 
139Hinnebusch, Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba' thist Syria, 
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from agriculture. Additionally, less rainfall meant less 
water to turn turbines which, in turn, generated electricity 
for the manufacturing industry. '" 42 
c. The Failure o£ ISI 
The above highlights the lack of foresight of the 
individuals in charge of the economy. Syria's industrial 
problems, though, were varied and complex. Some of these 
deficiencies can be attributed to dominant economic themes. 
As editor of Privatization and Liberalization in the 
Middle East, Iliya Harik blames the region's governments' 
nationalistic and socialistic motivations for poor economic 
performance in the 1970s and 1980s. Governments in the Middle 
East, like other socialist governments, believed that with 
central planning, they could best organize their economies 
into ones that would allow their countries to escape from 
dependency on advanced countries. As part of their scheme to 
move towards independence and prosperity, countries in the 
region nationalized most industries in the 1960s and pursued 
policies of import substitution industrialization (ISI). 
Harik states that ISI, "Created pressure on the productive 
units to meet domestic consumption needs. It also resulted in 
a shortfall in hard-currency revenue to meet the increasing 
expenditure on imports of capital goods, raw materials, and 
intermediate goods. "143 This was the case in Syria. 
Richards and Waterbury echo Harik's view that ISI 
did not serve its intended purpose of enriching states. 
Instead, "Protection of import-substituting industries created 
gross inefficiencies at the same time that the industries 
142Heydemann, 18 . 
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and Liberalization in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992) 2 - 3. 
59 
themselves developed little capacity to earn foreign exchange 
in highly competitive external markets." These industries 
served as a sieve that drew on public funds instead of a tool 
for delivering countries from the developed world. 144 
Syria's experience with ISI has proven to be no exception. 
Despite a declared "self-reliance" campaign by 
Syrian officials to manufacture parts for foreign machines, no 
actual move was made to build factories to produce machine 
components and gears for local industries. New ISI projects 
undertaken were not appropriately suited for the Syrian labor 
force. Perthes notes: 
The new projects were capital intensive and needed 
a comparatively small but well-trained labor force, 
and were highly dependent on imported raw 
materials, semi-finished products, and spare parts. 
Deficiencies ... meant that production fell short of 
the projects' capabilities, and the resulting 
products were of poor quality and largely 
unsuitable for competition in foreign markets . 145 
Instead of first perfecting simple manufacturing processes and 
developing a solid base for infrastructure, the Asad regime 
unrealistically set its sights on establishing complex 
industries. 
As author Peter F. Drucker writes, "In the end the 
very growth of the infant industries defeats them. "146 Like 
infant industries in many countries, Syria's industries never 
diversified and failed to mature into money-makers. Instead, 
the regime was forced to reach deeper into public coffers and 
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rely on foreign 
d. Graft and Corruption 
funds, capital, and 
Another domestic factor which led Syria into crisis 
during the 1980s was the presence and tolerance of graft and 
corruption. Again, Richards and Waterbury provide a useful 
framework in which to examine this phenomenon. Referring to 
officials across the Middle East, they write: 
Bureaucrats behaved rationally, not 
altruistically ... Because the top-level managerial 
career was unstable and subject to arbitrary and 
unpredictable political whims and infighting, 
managers increasingly seized the moment to line 
their pockets and to build an economic hedge 
against the future. 148 
In Syria, in an attempt to further their spoils, 
officers and other high-placed government officials engaged in 
shady practices and formed mutually beneficial relationships 
with the new commercial class. Hinnebusch writes that 
"politicized officers have become ... a burden on development: 
paying themselves the best salaries in Syria ... and engaging in 
corrupt business (eg. smuggling), they drain the treasury and 
frustrate the rational management of the economy. "149 
According to Patrick Seale, the economic policies of 
President Asad created "instant millionaires at the nation's 
expense. "150 A press correspondent also noted the negative 
147Perthes, "The Syrian Economy in the 1980s," 54. 
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effects of corrupt alliances on the common Syrian. "Class 
configurations are becoming increasingly polarized as the 
nouveau riches unabashedly flaunt their wealth and, for the 
first time, the poor are to be found rummaging in 
rubbish ... looking for food." 151 While the personal accounts 
of bourgeoisie members were fattened in the 1980s, the middle 
and lower classes carried the burden of austerity measures 
adopted by the government. 152 
G. ECONOMIC HARDSHIP ON THE COMMON CITIZEN 
The Syrian populace began to feel the effects of fiscal 
strain in the mid-1980s, as basic commodities were 
increasingly difficult to find. 153 An American of Syrian 
birth, who traveled to Damascus in 1988 to visit family, 
confirms that the atmosphere was indeed dismal. According to 
this person, "Everyday items were very difficult and expensive 
for people on the street to buy. There were shortages of 
food, fuel, and all kinds of goods. "154 Syrians' plight 
continued from the mid-1980s and into the 1990s. 
In 1991, The Middle East reported a sight which would not 
have been seen five years earlier. "Poor boys and young men 
eagerly seeking casual employment, be it from cleaning 
windscreens at traffic lights and road junctions to competing 
151
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for sui teases to carry at Damascus airport. "155 Despite a 
slight improvement in the economy in the preceding few years, 
the less affluent city dwellers and rural peasants in Syrian 
society continued to face adverse circumstances. These are 
the same individuals upon whom the Ba'th party and Asad regime 
based their political platform. The regime figured out in the 
mid-1980s that letting them suffer would destroy the social 
contract upon which the government had built its platform. 
This would mean the ruin of the Asad and his close circle of 
supporters. 
H. A RECIPE FOR CHANGE 
The regime and Ba'th party officials, probably out of 
fear for their coveted positions, set about on a new move to 
overhaul the ineffective economy in the middle of decade. 
Therefore, despite serious criticism from conservative 
elements in Syria, the Eighth Regional Congress of the Ba'th 
Party convened in January 1985, and recommended that limited 
reforms be introduced so that private entrepreneurs could be 
given an enhanced role in the economy. If the public sector 
was unable to provide for Syrians, then perhaps, it was hoped, 
the private sector could assist . 156 
The same year represents a transition in Syria's economic 
history. Whereas economic reform from 1982 to 1985 did little 
to reorganize the actual layout of the economy, plans after 
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formal stabilization program and included several 
measures that might, under the World Bank 
definition, qualify as structural adjustments 
rather than stabilization. 
The initiatives, along with ones begun even earlier, were 
orchestrated to make Syria more appealing to foreign 
investors. 157 
The primary author of this new infiraj was the same man 
who had scripted the original infiraj policies of the early 
1970s. Dr. Muhammad Imadi, an economist trained in the U.S., 
returned to his post of Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade 
in March of 1985 after a sabbatical of several years. 158 His 
appointment, which was likely based on his expertise, could 
also be interpreted as a move to attract foreign capital. 
Then, in 1987, a major cabinet reshuffle occurred, placing 
reform-minded individuals into influential economic positions. 
The most significant switch removed Prime Minister Abdel al-
Qasm and replaced him with Mahmoud Zuabi, a successful 
agronomist. 159 
Initiatives taken under Imadi and his fellow technocrats 
included large reductions in subsidies for consumer items and 
encouraging more active participation of the new class and the 
private sector, especially in the import-export business. For 
example, Legislative Decree No. 10 of 1986 facilitated the 
creation of joint-stock enterprises in agriculture and 
tourism. Under this arrangement, private companies were 
permitted to retain 75 percent of all profits. Beginning in 
1987, certain companies were allowed to keep 75 percent of 
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foreign exchange earnings for particular imports -- up from 50 
percent under a policy begun the year before. 
In May and June of 1991, two other important pieces of 
legislature were enacted -- Laws 10 and 20. According to 
Heydemann, "The former further eased restrictions on private-
sector investment and the latter reformed the Syrian tax code 
to remove provisions that penalized business profits. "160 
Between May and September of 1991, 40 new investment projects 
were approved by the government under Law 10. 161 
For fear of loosing credibility over economic issues, 
Asad realized the private sector had a pivotal role to play in 
helping Syria escape from its domestically-created economic 
malaise. Again, Harik's general comments about Middle Eastern 
countries' experiences shed light on Syria's situation: 
Originally founded on the premise of delinking 
[from developed countries] and self sufficiency, 
the patron state found itself achieving neither 
objective ... The main drive for change came from the 
fact that regimes were losing credibility and 
legitimacy among the general public in proportion 
to their ability to deliver ... Thus the state moved 
toward economic liberalization ... in the hope that 
an injection of fresh economic actors and capital 
would help a declining economy to regain its 
fortunes. 162 
Stagnation in the 1980s necessitated that the regime 
change Syria's economic equation and modify its foreign policy 
stance. Hinnebusch notes, "Private business had to be given 
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concessions to fill the gap. 11163 The new class of 
entrepreneurs was more than happy to comply, since profit for 
the state also represented money in their pockets. 
Although the public sector continued to receive most of 
the accolades in front of large crowds, the private sector 
from the mid-1980s onward became a crucial element in Asad's 
recovery scheme. Dr. Imadi states: 
We believe in the public sector. It plays an 
important role in our infrastructure. The idea of 
our economic reform is not to transfer ownership, 
it is to add to what we already have .... [Economic 
reform has caused] a change in the mentality of our 
people ... [and it] has many political, economic, and 
social implications. It shows that we are open to 
the outside world and it is a great change for the 
better . 164 
It was the 11 Social implications" which Asad and his 
lieutenants had to closely monitor to assure that Syrian 
society was being massaged rather than rocked by economic 
change. 
In the name of long- term economic stability and to 
protect their coveted positions, the men at the top were 
forced to play a dangerous game in the mid-1980s. This 
involved giving the technocrats and the new class enough 
leeway to mold their fiscal plans and work their business 
magic while simultaneously holding the confidence of the 
public sector. However reluctant he may have been, Asad ceded 
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some direct control over the economy to technocrats and 
businessmen. 165 Dr. Andrew Rathmell addresses the issue: 
The balance of economic power has been gradually 
shifting inside Syria and there have been signs 
that Asad has begun to build a new constituency 
which incorporates more private sector 
businessmen .... These subtle changes indicate that 
Asad has been cautiously co-opting new elements 
into his autocratic state as a method of widening 
its political and economic base . 166 
Technocrats and businessmen began to mold a new fiscal 
policy because they figured that the masses were on their 
side. It became apparent to the populace, at the end of the 
1980s, that socialism had failed in Europe and that public 
sector control of the economy was also failing in Syria. 
Syrians were tired of making sacrifices in the name of 
socialist development and in the name of military opposition 
to Israel. Sadowski writes: 
Syrian civilian technocrats were granted 
unprecedented authority ... Most Syrian's agreed that 
the economy deserved priority ... Many Syrians began 
to argue publicly that the country's real battle 
was not with Iraq or even Israel; rather they 
said, "Our war is against poverty." There is 
a ... conviction that in the future economic 
development should take priority. 167 
Professor Fred Lawson's findings are similar: 
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Jane's 
Both private capital and the populace at large 
evidenced a consistent and growing interest in 
terminating the 45-year-old state of war with 
Israel, so that the central administration's 
attention could be focused on measures designed to 
improve public services and promote economic growth 
within Syria itself. 168 
By the turn of the decade the average citizen, who had 
listened to Ba'thism's promises for so long, realized that one 
can not eat and clothe himself in idealism and rhetoric. 
I. DOMESTIC SHORTCOMINGS DRIVE FOREIGN POLICY 
Technocrats and the new class were willing to assist the 
state in its plight because they themselves profited 
handsomely. With their assistance came insistence 
insistence that they be allowed more lucrative contacts with 
the West. Dr. Imadi described Law 10 as a means to "open to 
the outside world." Technocrats convinced Asad that the 
provision of services to the Syrian populace over the long run 
would require regular and reliable cash flow in the form of 
aid or money from business projects. Cash generated from 
overproduction of a few oil fields and Gulf aid would not last 
indefinitely. Regarding Syria's development strategy, Perthes 
writes, "The goals were to be achieved with the help of 
foreign financing and by means of an economic opening ... to the 
West." 169 For this to occur, Asad needed, in the late-1980s 
and early 1990s, to keep diplomatic channels open to the 
United States and the West. 
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Ten years before, Egypt, hoping to capitalize on Western 
developmental capital, had set the example for Syria. 
Richards and Waterbury describe Egypt's infi tab strategy under 
Sadat as a "turning West" and a "geographical restructuring of 
trade." Another Egyptian goal, according to the authors was 
"to lure Western investment and technology through joint 
ventures with Egyptian public or private enterprises. "170 
Unlike Sadat, Asad rejected International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) aid and, thus, IMF donor country demands up to and past 
the Madrid Peace Conference. However, Syria's ambitious 
economic structural adjustments curiously resembled those 
often recommended when the IMF grants loans to a country. It 
seems the Asad regime was attempting to stabilize Syria's 
economy and appear attractive to Western investors without 
actually turning to the IMF and playing by its rules. 
J. TWO SOURCES OF PRESSURE FOR CHANGE 
Well before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the regime 
drifted towards adopting a foreign policy more conciliatory 
toward the West, particularly toward the United States. This 
was done in the hope of attracting Western funds and business 
in a crucial restructuring period. The regime was motivated 
to undertake policy changes for two interrelated reasons. 
The first reason was the cold, hard fact, recognized by 
Asad after Arab aid began to dwindle in the mid-1980s, that 
Syria could not hope to prosper without ties to Western 
markets. A 1989 article in MEED noted, "Asad has had to face 
the bleak reality that economic recovery will need to be aid-
financed, and that this will require political concessions and 
the trimming of his strategic ambitions. 11171 Although the 
170Richards and Waterbury, 241. 
171David Butter, 11 Asad' s Policies Win Him No Friends, 11 7. 
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Eastern Bloc could provide weapons, the regime figured out 
sometime in the mid-1980s that without Western know-how and 
capital, Syria would be never reach modernity. 
A second likely motivation for Syria seeking financial 
ties to the West is less easily proved. This impetus resulted 
from informal pressure placed on the regime by the newest 
members of the regime's coalition-- the civilian technocrats 
redesigning the economy and new class of businessmen fueling 
it. There is some evidence that technocrats and businessmen 
had caught Asad's ear sometime in the middle of the last 
decade. They had become an integral, although small, part of 
the regime's base of support. 
In exchange for a stable Syrian society in the late-1980s 
and into the 1990s, beginning as far back as the mid-1980s, 
the Asad regime sculpted quiet but calculated foreign policy 




Several analysts and authors blindly charge that Syria 
revised its foreign policy when it accepted an invitation to 
attend peace talks in Madrid in 1991. They claim that Syria 
reacted to the demise of the country's principle strategic-
military partner, the Soviet Union, and to the end of the Cold 
War. Not only are these individuals mistaken as to when Syria 
began to modify its foreign relations with the West, but they 
have wrongly identified the true causes behind the 
modifications. 
When forging a policy toward the United States, the 
regime of Hafiz al-Asad was not merely reacting to some late-
breaking international forces. By the time Syria sent a 
delegation to Madrid, Asad had, for at least six or seven 
years, been gradually shaping a policy more conciliatory 
toward American interests. Asad's policy modifications 
stemmed predominantly from internal factors and not external 
considerations. 
While external factors played a role the virtual 
disappearance of Soviet military assistance and the emergence 
of the United States as the world's only true superpower --
they acted to consolidate a process begun years earlier which 
was rooted in domestic Syrian politics. External shifts, such 
as the above, occurred long after the regime began its 
maneuvering to improve ties with America. Instead, events and 
circumstances that sprung from economic crisis in the early-
1980s prompted Asad to make changes in Syria's domestic and 
foreign external dealings in the name of regime survival. 
The Syrian President, beginning in the mid-1980s, adapted 
the way his country acted and reacted toward America for two 
complementary reasons. First, the Asad regime realized the 
West held the ticket to improved financial conditions within 
Syria. Second, civilian technocrats who designed policies of 
71 
infiraj and businessmen who implemented those policies 
pressured those at the top into giving them additional access 
to Western markets. They were successful in this endeavor 
because the Syrian President respected their ability to 
generate revenue from their business contacts in the West and, 
hence, better enable the regime to deliver services to the 
Syrian populace. Asad allowed the new class political 
leverage because he relied on the private sector's ability to 
supplement the decrepid public sector and integrate Syria into 
the international economic system. 
Improved financial ties to the United States and its 
allies required better Syrian diplomatic relations with the 
same. In a further continuance of diplomatic actions begun in 
the rnid-1980s, Asad carne to the peace table in 1991 to improve 
Syria's economic lot and ultimately to guarantee the regime's 
coveted spot within Syrian society. 
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